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ABSTRACT 
 
The electricity market in Portugal was recently opened to all consumers. 
However, it remains highly concentrated in terms of control of production and 
supply and the long-term power purchase arrangements still coexist with free 
market. This paper discusses the electricity market restructuring process in 
Portugal, presenting its main marks over the past years and the present situation. 
The evolution of the electricity prices in Portugal is analysed, and a comparison 
with EU-15 is presented. Special attention is given to Spain due to the possibility 
of cross-border competition in the future arising from the formation of the Iberian 
electricity market.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1995, the European Union (EU) published a White Paper (European 
Commission, 1995) where the goals of the European energy policy were outlined: 
overall competitiveness, security of energy supply and environmental protection. 
The liberalisation of the internal market for electricity and natural gas was stated 
as a primary and central aim. Since then, important steps have been taken to meet 
liberalisation objectives in the energy market. The electricity directive 96/92/EC 
and the gas directive 98/30/CE were adopted, laying down the rules to allow for 
real competition and to give consumers a free choice of energy suppliers. In 2003, 
the directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC, concerning common rules for the 
internal electricity and natural gas markets, respectively, replaced these directives.   
 
The EU supports that the implementation of the Directive 96/92/EC brought 
benefits in terms of efficiency gains, price reductions, higher standards of service 
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and increased competitiveness. However, it also points the need to focus on the 
risk of market dominance and predatory behaviour (Directive 2003/54/EC) and 
considers that Directive 96/92/EC has not been adequate to achieve the objective 
of competition, even for larger users (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005a). The same way the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2001), points that 
competition is the most effective way to establish sustained incentives to keep 
costs and prices down.  
 
The MEMO published in 2004 by the European Commission (2004a), pointed out 
that while the first results of the opening of the European market are positive, 
much remains to be done to ensure a competitive market. This study and the 2005 
report (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a) call attention to the 
problem of the existence of companies with excessive market power at national 
level and to the need to promote cross-border exchanges in order to increase the 
scope for competition.  
 
As Jamasb (2006) points out, a successful reform of the electricity sector can 
improve the efficiency and offer lower prices, and better quality of service. 
However these benefits may be undermined by flawed reform design and 
ineffective regulation and competition. The same way, Newbery (2002) states that 
for the successful liberalisation of the electricity markets, suppliers must have 
access to the transmission system, the generation capacity must be adequate and 
there must be appropriate regulation. Else, liberalisation may lead to higher prices. 
 
The question of the effects of liberalization on competition and the resulting 
benefits to consumers was already been brought to light by several authors. The 
arguments in favour of liberalisation include the expectable price reduction for the 
consumers. For example, a recent simulation study conducted for some European 
countries, corroborates this view and concludes that the prices in perfect 
competition scenarios are lower than in high market power scenarios (Lise et al, 
2006).  
 
However, some recent examples may be found in the literature challenging the 
price reduction argument. The Percebois and White (2001) study, compared the 
UK and French electricity markets and concluded that in the liberalised UK 
industry the major price reductions achievements were still concentrated in the 
largest industrial consumers. Also, after 10 years of reforming process in UK, the 
sate-owned French electricity industry was still performing better for most 
consumer categories. Bower et al (2001) describes the German electricity 
liberalisation and the subsequent strategic response of the firms, resulting in 
creation of four dominant firms. The authors conclude that this strategy appears to 
result in an increase in market power and could lead to greater prices than the 
competitive levels that initially emerged. The same way, Green (2006) addresses 
the response of the companies to liberalisation in Europe and calls attention to the 
problem of the increasing concentration of the European electricity industry due 
to the companies’ expansion across national borders, which may limit the 
effectiveness of competition (Jamasb and Pollitt , 2006)”. 
 
Further reading on these matters may include among many others, Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2006), reviewing the European electricity liberalisation process; Thomas 
 3
(2006), addressing electricity industry reforms also in small European countries; 
Al-Sunaidy and Green (2006), discussing the electricity deregulation in OECD 
countries or Jamasb (2006), examining the electricity reform experience in 
developing countries. These and other works (for example Newbery, 2002 and 
Haas and Auer, 2006) also describe some of the problems experienced during the 
market reforms, draw some lessons and point some conditions necessary for the 
success of this process.  
 
In Portugal, the first move towards the opening of the generation sector was made 
in 1981. However, only in the middle 1990’s was initiated the process of 
liberalisation for large industrial consumers. Since then the concept of eligibility 
has been extended to smaller consumers reaching full legal opening of the market 
in July 2004. However, the eligibility of the household consumers will only be 
effective in September 2006. Nevertheless, the Portuguese electricity market still 
presents high levels of concentration and a level of consumer activity, not 
indicative of a competitive market. The European Commission considers that 
Portugal is still at the early stages of the development of competition in the 
electricity market. (European Commission, 2004a).   
 
The focus of this paper is to analyse the present situation of the Portuguese1 
electricity market. The evolution of the Portuguese electricity prices over the past 
years are examined, and the results are compared with those in the EU-15, and in 
particular compared with prices in Spain, because of the possibilities of cross-
border exchanges of power.   
 
The paper begins by describing briefly the Portuguese electrical system, its degree 
of market opening and state of competition. In the third section, an analysis of the 
electricity prices is presented, including the household and industrial consumers. 
The Portuguese prices are compared with the equivalent EU-15 market and with 
the Spanish market. The main conclusions are summarised at the end. 
 
2. THE PORTUGUESE ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 
 
The organization of the Portuguese electricity sector was defined by Decree-Law 
182/95 to 187/95 and changed by Decree-Laws 56/97 and 198/2000. More 
recently, Decree-Laws 184/2003 and 185/2003 initiated a revision process of the 
National Electricity System (NES), addressing the adaptation of the Portuguese 
system to the new Iberian market (MIBEL). The model is based on the existence 
of two sub-systems: the public electricity system (PES) and the independent 
electricity system (IES). Figure 1 represents the general structure of the 
Portuguese Electricity System.  
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NATIONAL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM (NES)
Independent electricity system (IES)
Non-binding electricity system (NBES)
•Non-binding producers
•Non-binding distributors
•Non-binding suppliers
•Non-binding clients
Special regime producers (SRP)
•Small hydro (< 10 MW)
•Other renewable energies
•Cogeneration
Public electricity system (PES) 
Binding producers 
National transmission company (NTC)
Binding distributors 
Clients of the PES
Regulated suppliers 
External agents
Energy Services Regulatory Authority (ERSE)
 
Figure 1- National Electricity System in 2004 (Source: ERSE web page, EDP, 2003 and 2005) 
 
The PES is obliged to assure the supply of electricity to the all-continental 
territory as a public service system. It comprises the production activity, the 
national transportation grid and the distribution activity. 
 
The binding producers are bonded to the NTC with an exclusivity long term 
contract (PPA- Power Purchase Arrangement) and are obliged to exclusively 
supply the PES. The NTC holds the concession to operate the transmission 
network with exclusivity as a public service system. Rede Eléctrica Nacional, SA 
(REN) is presently the company responsible for the electricity transmission in 
Portugal. The binding Medium Voltage (MV) and High Voltage (HV)2 
distributors are bonded to the NTC, and may only acquire electricity out of the 
PES up to a limit of 8% their energy and power requirements. The regulated 
suppliers are obliged to supply all the PES clients. Decree-Law 185/2003 
appointed EDP Distribuição as the regulated supplier and last resource supplier.  
 
The non-binding electricity system (NBES) and the special regime producers 
(SRP) form the IES. The NBES is organized as a non-regulated market system 
with free access to the production and MV and HV distribution activities. It 
comprises the non-biding producers, distributors, suppliers and clients. The non-
biding producers and clients may use the PES transmission and distribution grids 
on payment of a regulated tariff. The external agents are companies legally 
established in other EU countries entitled to buy or sell electricity. These agents 
along with suppliers may perform cross border commercial transactions using the 
interconnections of the transmission grid.             
 
According to the European Union (EU) Directive 2003/54/EC, the member states 
must assure that all consumers are free to purchase electricity from the supplier of 
their choice (eligible consumers) after July 2007. The Portuguese legislation is 
ahead in time. In fact, with the publication in August of Decree-law 192/2004 the 
small electricity consumers became also eligible. By law, all the consumers 
located in Continental Portugal may now have access to the NBES, meaning that 
they may choose their supplier and negotiate their relationship. According to 
ERSE, the effective free choice for the small consumers will only be possible in 
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September 2006 (ERSE, 2005a), after the implementation of the computer system 
necessary for managing the switching supplier procedure.  
 
The SRP include the small hydro generation, the cogeneration and the production 
from other renewable sources. The public electricity grid is obliged to buy the 
electricity produced by the SRP during the licence period at prices based on the 
avoided costs to the PES and on the environmental benefits provided by each one 
of the energy sources used for electricity production.  
 
ERSE regulates the Portuguese energy sector. One of its main purposes is the 
regulation of the PES and the relationship between PES and NBES. Some of the 
generic competences of ERSE include setting tariffs, namely the electricity prices 
for final Low Voltage (LV) consumers, setting prices for the services of the NTG 
company and binding distribution companies and issuing codes for commercial 
relations and grid access. 
 
2.1 The Portuguese liberalisation process  
 
The liberalisation of the electricity market in Portugal followed a process similar 
to most of other countries. Al-Sunaidy and Green (2006) point out that this 
process usually starts by allowing the entry of independent power producers with 
long-term contracts. The creation of an active wholesale market and the opening 
of retailing to competition came in a later stage. Figure 2 resumes the legal 
calendar of the Portuguese liberalisation process.  
 
Possibility of
auto-production
1988 1991 1995 1996 2003 20041981
Independent production
from renewable energy 
sources and cogeneration
PES and 
licensed system 
Bases of PES 
and IES
Directive 
96/92/CE
Directive 
2003/54/EC
Revision of NES
Full retail 
Competition
Generation competition Supply competition
Wholesale 
market
?
 
 
Figure 2- Main legal marks of the liberalisation of the Portuguese electricity market. 
 
In Portugal, in 1981 Decree-Law 20/81 referred for the first time the possibility of 
electricity auto-production, for entities accessorily producing electricity from 
renewable energy sources or using technologies that would lead to the reduction 
of primary energy consumption. In 1986, Decree-Law 149/86 enlarged this 
concept to plants exclusively producing electricity. However, in 1988 Decree-Law 
189/88 recognised that a quicker process was needed and the creation of 
conditions allowing for the economic viability of the small plants. This Decree-
Law replaced the previous ones and established the rules for independent power 
production, allowing this production from renewable energy sources and 
cogeneration3.  
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In 1991, Decree-Law 99/91 established the existence of the Public Electricity 
System along with the licensed system, opening way to the full competition in 
generation sector. In 1995, Decree-Laws 182/95 to 187/95 reassessed Decree-Law 
99/91, defining the bases of the Public and of the Independent Electricity 
Systems4. The progressive opening of the retail market, between 1995 (Decree-
Law 182/95) and 2004 (Decree-Law 192/2004), followed the process.  
 
As for the wholesale market, it is being prepared jointly with Spain. In January 
2004, the Portuguese and Spanish governments signed an agreement to develop a 
common Iberian power market (MIBEL), approved by the Resolution of the 
Assembly of Republic 33-A/2004. MIBEL was expected to start functioning in 
April 2004; however the start date has been successively delayed with out any 
forecasts for the beginning of its operation.  
 
In 2003, Decree-Laws 184/2003 and 185/2003 established the dispositions for the 
supply, importation and exportation activities in the free Iberian market. Once this 
market is on operation, electricity will be traded by bi-lateral contracts or on 
organized market and the PPA will be ceased. However, the anticipation of the 
end of these contracts implies economical compensations to the involved 
companies. Decree-Law 240/2004, published in December 2004, presents already 
the maximum compensation values for the PES power plants.  
 
2.2 Indicators of the Portuguese electricity market 
Figure 3 represents the electricity balance for Portugal in 20045. Figure 4 
illustrates the value chain and main elements of the Portuguese electricity market, 
based on the general value chain already described and on the electricity balance. 
In both figures the position of the EDP Group in the National market is 
underlined.  
 
Others production
NBES 0
PES 10675
SRP 3858
Total 14533
EDP Production
NBES 3817
PES 20474
SRP 622
Total 24913
Total production1
NBES 3817
PES 31149
SRP 4480
Total 39446
Auto-consumption and losses     4613
Exchanges with abroad (6481)
Total (1869)
Total for distribution
NBES 6762
PES 34552
Total 41314
Others supply
NBES 2381
PES 0  
Total 2381
EDP supply
NBES 4381
PES 34552
Total 38933  
Figure 3- Portuguese electricity balance, 2004 (GWh) (Source: own elaboration from EDP, 2005) 
 
 7
Primary fuel
External elements to National market
VHV market
Generation
EDP (63%) and others (37%)
Transmission
REN
Distribution
EDP and same small LV distributors
Supply
EDP (94%) and others (6%)
HV market MV market LV market
Regulated tariff
Regulated tariff
Regulated tariff (PES) and open access (IES)
PPA (PES), open access (NBES) and regulated tariff (SRP)
 
Figure 4- Value chain and main elements of the Portuguese electricity market for 2004 (Source: 
own elaboration based on Oxera, 2003, EDP, 2004b and EDP, 2005).  
 
According to these figures, in 2004, the PES system represented 79% of the total 
electricity production of the Portuguese electricity system, followed by the SRP 
with 11% of the total production and finally the NBES with 10%. The number of 
non-binding consumers, although rising, still represents a small amount of the 
total electricity consumption (about 10% of the total electricity for distribution). 
The EDP Group has a dominant position in the electricity market, being present in 
all the elements: production, transmission, distribution and supply, both in the 
public and independent systems. This Group is responsible for 63% of the total 
electricity production and 94% of the total electricity supply. It also holds the 
infrastructures of the electricity distribution grid in MV and HV and manages and 
operates most of the LV distribution grid in Portugal. Additionally, the EDP 
Group has a 30% shareholding in REN.  
 
2.3 Critical overview 
 
Being considered an eligible consumer by the legislation is the primary condition 
for a consumer to be able to choose a supplier and participate in the free market. 
However, it is important to distinguish the eligible market from the truly 
competitive market. In fact, the European Commission (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004 and European Commission, 2004a) observes that 
the high levels of market power among existing companies represent one of the 
major obstacles to competition. In order to tackle this problem, the above studies 
suggest that measures to promote cross border exchanges and improve inter-
connection are key requirements for the development of a competitive internal 
electricity market.  
 
In Portugal, the market is now completely open and even by 2002 the eligible 
consumers represented already about 54% of the total electricity consumption 
(EDP, 2003). However, the PES is still the most relevant sub-system of the NES 
and the EDP Group maintains the effective market dominance, especially for the 
supply sector. This Group also operates the distribution network, under a 
regulated system.  
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The European Commission reports (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005a and 2005c) expose some problems in the Portuguese electrical system: the 
excessive market concentration for generation and supply, the existence of long 
term PPAs, the existence of regulated end user prices, and the accounting 
unbundling of the distribution from the supply activity. However, in terms of 
consumer activity, Portugal presents a positive performance. The cumulative 
volume of electricity consumption having switched reached 16%, since market 
opening (Commission of the European Communities, 2005c). This value falls 
behind some countries like UK or Spain, but represents a clear improvement from 
the previous value of 9% for large eligible industrial users presented in the 2004 
report (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b) . 
 
As for electricity production, the Portuguese market is characterized by a very 
high level of concentration, with the share of the Top 3 producers reaching 76% 
by the end of 2004 (Commission of the European Communities, 2005b). Of those 
producers, Group EDP is the largest one and also owns shares in the other two: 
Tejo Energia and TurboGás. The competition in the production stage relies only 
on independent producers and import flows. Generators in the PES and SRP do 
not compete in the market and are paid by administrative established prices 
(ERSE, 2005b).  
 
The long term PPAs in the Portuguese market contributes to make the process of 
competition difficult and these contracts need to be reduced or terminated to 
maximize competitive supply options (Soares, 2003, IEA, 2004). The initial 
findings of the European Commission inquiry for the energy sector indicate that 
the long term PPAs are an entry barrier for new entrants in the market. These 
PPAs have only limited effect on the price formation process on electricity 
wholesale markets and may be among the main causes for the low volumes of 
electricity traded on the wholesale markets (European Commission Competition 
DG, 2006).  
 
Decree-Law 185/2003 establishes a set of transition rules for the creation of the 
free electricity market and predicts the extinction of these long-term contracts. In 
December 2004 Decree-Law 240/2004 was published defining the rules for the 
extinction of PPAs. In January 2005 the Cessation Agreement between CPPE and 
REN was already signed (EDP, 2005). However, the cessation of these contracts 
will only be effective after the launching of the organized market.  
 
In fact, the PES producers represent more than 70% of the total installed power in 
Portugal and have access to these contracts, protecting them from market 
competition and granting supply exclusivity and fixed rewards for energy sold. 
This means that new entrants will only be able to compete for the much smaller 
independent market and even there, they must face the competition from Group 
EDP already operating in both markets. A competitive wholesale market would 
reduce the entry barriers for both the independent generators and suppliers 
because for the moment, independent generators do not supply the largest bulk of 
the market and independent suppliers do not have access to uncommitted 
generation from PES generators.  
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In Portugal, the market share of foreign suppliers in the IES was about 35%, in 
2004. The second largest supplier was the Spanish company Endesa, with a total 
market share in the IES of 27% (ERSE, 2005c). However, considering the total 
Portuguese electricity consumption, the share of foreign suppliers is only about 
6%. In addition, the import capacity represents only 8% of the total installed 
generation capacity (Commission of the European Communities, 2005c). The low 
number of active suppliers along with the low levels of interconnection capacity 
may represent important obstacles to the competition process. 
 
Presently there are no fully independent suppliers. In the IES, the largest supplier 
is EDP Corporate a company subsidiary of Group EDP, meaning that it has a 
close relationship with generating companies and distributors. The others 
suppliers are not affiliate to the Portuguese electricity network, but they are linked 
to Spanish producers.  
 
The EU endorsed the target for Member States to have a level of electricity 
interconnection equivalent to at least 10% of their installed production capacity by 
2005 (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). The European 
Commission recognizes the need for the electricity network reinforcement in 
Portugal-Spain, and this project was included among the nine priority axes of the 
trans-European electricity network in the EU (European Commission, 2004b).  
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) is aware that the electricity market in 
Portugal has developed significantly in the past few years; however, IEA is also 
concerned that the market remains dominated by EDP. In its recent review for 
Portugal the IEA (2004) considers the increase of interconnections with Spain as 
an important initiative for increasing competition in the electricity market in 
Portugal. It also supports the need to address the question of the concentrated 
generation at the Iberian level. In fact, only increasing cross border trade may not 
be the solution due to the grid congestion and to the fact that the generation 
market in Spain is also highly concentrated, with the two largest companies 
(Endesa and Iberdrola) representing 51% of the total generation capacity in the 
Iberian market in 2004.  
 
Portugal is no exception in the EU. The Communication of the European 
Communities (Commission of the European Communities, 2003) shows an 
unsatisfactory position in several of the member states in terms of electricity 
market concentration. This study argues in particular that the slow progress in 
developing interconnectors between Spain and Portugal and in the completion of 
an integrated market still means that the largest companies retain a significant 
degree of control in the segmented markets. 
 
3. ANALISYS OF THE ELECTRICITY PRICES 
 
The liberalisation of the electricity market in Portugal was initiated in 1995 for 
large consumers, and reached full opening of the market in 2004. The 
liberalisation process was expected to increase competition, resulting in more 
favourable tariffs to the end users. In this section, the electricity prices in Portugal 
over the past years are analysed, compared with those in  the EU-15 countries and 
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in particular with prices in Spain, due to the possibility of  competition arising 
from cross border electricity trade.  
 
3.1 Evolution of the electricity prices in Portugal 
 
Figure 5 and 6 present the evolution of the electricity prices, in Portugal for the 
household and industrial sector respectively. The study includes the standard 
consumers defined by the EUROSTAT. The prices were deflated using the GDP 
prices index. The household prices include taxes and the industrial prices exclude 
VAT.  
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Figure 5- Electricity prices in Portugal for the household sector, 1999 to 2005. Deflated prices, all 
taxes included.  (Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2003, 2004a and 2005a data)6. 
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Figure 6- Electricity prices in Portugal for the industrial sector, 1999 to 2005. Deflated prices, 
VAT excluded. (Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2003, 2004b and 2005b data)7.  
 
In general, there has been a descending trend for the electricity prices during the 
five years analysed, for both the household and industrial sectors. For the 
household sector, the reduction of the average price was 7% during this period. 
All the consumers benefited, but especially the largest consumers (De) whose 
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prices were reduced in more than 9% in real terms. The price reduction lied 
between 6 and 7% for the small and medium consumers.  
 
 In the industrial sector the reduction of the average price was 9%, between 1999 
and 2005, benefiting once more all the consumers. However, these benefits did 
not spread almost uniformly among all the segments as happened in the household 
sector. Medium consumers Ib, Ic and Id obtained the largest prices reductions 
(15%, 14% and 12% respectively). Small consumers (Ia) benefited from a 6% 
price reduction. As for large consumers (Ih and Ii), their price reduction was close 
to 3%. Ig consumers were an exception, experiencing a small price increase.  
 
The smallest price reduction obtained by the largest industrial consumers during 
the period analysed may be justified by the favourable tariffs available to them. 
These consumers were the first to have access to the free market, since the middle 
1990’s. However, IEA (2004) calls attention to another important factor, viz., that 
the regulated tariffs for the largest consumers are below market prices. Because of 
this, few of these consumers are willing to purchase electricity in the market. In 
fact, in 2004 only a few more than 2% of the HV electricity was purchased 
through the NBES in Portugal against more than 50% of the MV electricity (EDP, 
2005). This means that the HV consumers (Ih and Ii) remain in the PES being 
charged by regulated tariffs. As it is pointed out by the IEA (2004) this fact is 
counter-intuitive to the experience in liberalised markets where the largest 
consumers are generally the most active in switching suppliers. But Portugal is 
not the only country where this happens. The European Commission Competition 
DG (2006), points that this may be due to an attempt of some Member States to 
ensure lower price levels for customers. It refers in particular to the complaints 
from the Spanish electricity suppliers about the level of the regulated tariffs being 
to low. This is a problem for the future Iberian market and as the IEA (2004) 
states “… must be resolved at the Iberian level with the elimination of the all 
regulated electricity rates..”. 
 
3.2 Electricity prices in the EU 
 
Following, we present the empirical analysis comparing the Portuguese electricity 
prices with the EU-15 average and Spain. The study covered also the five 
household consumer categories and nine industrial consumer categories, defined 
by EUROSTAT using PPS prices. As Percebois and White (2001), we used prices 
converted to purchasing power standards (PPS). 
 
Comparing the electricity prices in Portugal with the average prices of the EU-15 
markets, it seems that the Portuguese prices are favourable in most consumer 
categories both for the household and industrial sector. Figure 7 and 8 represent 
the electricity prices for the household and industrial sector respectively for 
Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and EU-15 weighted average8, for July 2005 with all 
taxes included.  
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Figure 7- Electricity prices (PPS) in the EU for the household sector, July 2005. All taxes 
included. (Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2005c data). 
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Figure 8- Electricity prices (PPS) in the EU for the industrial sector, July 2005. All taxes included. 
(Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2005c data). 
 
The average household price is about 15% higher in Portugal than the European 
average, considering prices with all taxes. For this sector, the Portuguese 
electricity prices are higer than the European ones for all the consumer categories. 
Also, the prices in Portugal are about 33% higher than the Spanish ones, due to 
the highly competitive prices of electricity in Spain, which are among the lowest 
in Europe.  
 
As for the industrial sector, the Portuguese average price is about 5% higher than 
the European average, considering prices with all taxes. The average Spanish 
price is also lower than the Portuguese one, and in this case this difference is 
about 23%.  
 
However, it is also important to note that the electricity taxes in Portugal are 
amongst the lowest in the EU, representing only a few more than 5% of the total 
price. Meanwhile, the average electricity taxes in the EU-15 reach about 21%9 of 
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the total price. This means of course that the net prices charged by the Portuguese 
companies are much higher than the European ones.  
 
Figure 9 and 10 represent again the electricity prices for the household and 
industrial sector respectively for Portugal, Spain and EU-15 average, for July 
2005, but now excluding all taxes, in order to make the comparison independent 
of the tax system of the countries.  
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Figure 9- Electricity prices (PPS) in the EU for the household sector, July 2005. Taxes excluded. 
(Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2005c data). 
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Figure 10- Electricity prices (PPS) in the EU for the industrial sector, July 2005. Taxes excluded. 
(Source: own elaboration from Eurostat, 2005c data). 
 
Considering these net values, it is possible to conclude that, the average 
Portuguese price for the household sector is about 38% higher than the EU 
average. The price charged to small household consumers (Da) presents the 
smaller differential (about 10%), but all the other consumer categories prices are 
between 40 and 50% higher than the European average. The average Spanish 
price is 54% lower than the Portuguese average, reaching differences higher than 
60% for large household consumers.  
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The industrial sector tells quite a similar story. The Portuguese prices are amongst 
the highest in the EU, for all the consumer segments analysed. The average 
electricity price in Portugal is 28% higher than the European one. The average 
Spanish price is 43% lower than the Portuguese one, reaching the largest 
differences for medium industrial consumers (more than 50% for Ic, Id, Ie ,If and 
Ig). The Portuguese prices for large (Ih, Ii) and small (Ia, Ib) industrial consumers 
is between 20 and 35% higher than the Spanish ones. 
 
A similar situation was already discovered in the monopolistic natural gas sector 
in Portugal, where the gas companies charged net prices much higher than the 
European ones (Ferreira et al, 2004). As the electricity sector is already 
liberalised, a more favourable situation in terms of prices might have been 
expected. However, these results corroborate what was already stated: a 
liberalised market does not necessarily equate to a truly competitive one.  
 
The IEA (2001) also calls attention to this issue, supporting that attention should 
be paid to the divestitures and to the opening of national markets to international 
competition. This organism and Glachant (2003) underline that regulatory reform 
alone is not enough for competition to emerge. As the European Commission 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2005b) states “A successful 
competitive market is more likely to develop where there are a sufficient number 
of players in both the generation and supply market…”, otherwise it will result in 
“..greater regulation of wholesale and retail markets than is necessary or 
desirable”. 
 
The proximity with Spain and the lower prices charged by the Spanish electricity 
companies, represent an essential pressure factor for the achievement of reduced 
tariffs and for the creation of a competitive electricity market in electricity in 
Portugal. However, it will be necessary to ensure the development of adequate 
interconnection capacity and its fair allocation (IEA, 2004), along with the 
imposition of legal and regulatory measures, in order to allow these Spanish 
companies to compete in the electricity market in Portugal.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS  
 
Since July 2004 all Portuguese consumers are allowed to access the free 
electricity market. However, the market is still highly concentrated, with the EDP 
Group playing a dominant role across all the market elements. The 
implementation of MIBEL and the increase of the electricity transfer capacity 
between Portugal and Spain are major incentives for the development of 
competition in the electricity market in Portugal.  
  
Electricity market activity remains low with most of the consumers remaining in 
the PES. In addition, the highly concentrated market and the reduced tax rate, 
allow the Portuguese electricity companies to maintain net tariffs higher than the 
European ones. The average electricity prices in Portugal are also greater than 
those in Spain. Therefore as the IEA (2004) points out, there is a significant 
potential for a decrease in wholesale market price, once the Iberian market begins 
operation.  
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The Portuguese electricity industry has gone through dramatic changes (Soares, 
2003). However, most of the issues raised in the European Commission 
Competition DG (2006) report still represent a major problem for the Portuguese 
industry and may have adverse effect on the liberalisation process.  
 
The existence of PPA and lack of a competitive wholesale market, forces most of 
the Portuguese electricity to be traded on contract. Additionally, the market is still 
highly concentrated giving scope for market power, with the incumbent company 
operating both in the regulated and independent market. Although the legal 
unbundling of Group EDP is assured, the group subsidiaries companies are still 
major players in generation, distribution and supply activities.  
 
The cross-border acquisitions may also represent in the future an additional 
concern for the development of competition from Spanish companies. In fact, 
recently Iberdrola increased its stake in the Group EDP to 9.5% and it is now the 
second major shareholder of the Portuguese Group. Also, Endesa owns a 35% 
stake in Tejo Energia, the third largest generator company and owner of one of the 
two Portuguese coal power plants.  
 
The Portuguese government supports the liberalisation of the energy markets in 
order to increase overall competitiveness of the economy.  Resolution of 
Ministries 63/2003 states “… The liberalisation of the market, which is not an end 
by itself, is a way to obtaining larger efficiencies at both the production and 
energy consumption levels, allowing increased service quality and more 
competitive prices”. The same way, the following Resolution of Ministries 
169/2005 points that the liberalisation is essential to better serving industrial and 
household consumers and that above all, the process aims at improving the 
consumers’ access to energy and consequently reducing the energy bills.  
 
The present legislation, already allowed for the 100% legal opening of the market. 
However, this measure is not sufficient to assure the achievement of the proposed 
objectives. The success of the process is strongly dependent on the creation of 
conditions promoting a truly competitive market, characterized by a large number 
of competitors in generation and supply, reduced market shares and high rates of 
consumer switching, both in the household and industrial sectors.  
 
The launching of MIBEL, the increase of cross-border transactions, the end of 
PPA and efficient regulation are decisively important for the effective 
liberalisation of the Portuguese electricity market. In the future, the authors intend 
to follow closely the price policies of the electricity companies analysing the 
development of competition from National companies and clarifying the 
importance of the foreign competitors. This future research may bring new 
contributions to the debate on the impact of liberalisation on the electricity prices.  
 
FOOTNOTES 
1 This study focus only in Mainland Portugal. 
2 Very high voltage (VHV)- Voltage ranging between phases whose effective 
value is higher than 110 kV. 
High voltage (HV)- Voltage ranging between phases whose effective value is 
higher than 45 kV and lower than, or equal to, 110 kV. 
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Medium voltage (MV)- Voltage ranging between phases whose effective value is 
higher than 1 kV and equal to, or lower than, 45 kV. 
Low Voltage (LV)- Voltage ranging between phases whose effective value is 
equal to, or higher than, 1 kV and contracted power equal to, or lower than, 41.4 
kVA. 
Source: ERSE (2005b). 
 
3 Since its publication, Decree-Law 189/88 suffered some changes published in 
subsequent text laws. 
 
4 Since its publication, Decree-Law 182/95 suffered some changes published in 
subsequent Decrees-Law. 
 
5 The numbers refer only to the electricity injected in the national grid. The figure 
does not consider the electricity produced and consumed by independent 
consumers using private installations.  
 
6 Household sector: Da- 3kW contracted power; 600 kWh/year consumption; Db- 
3 to 4 kW contracted power; 1200 kWh/year consumption; Dc- 4 to 9 kW 
contracted power; 3500 kWh/year consumption (1300 kWh/year night); Dd- 6 to 
9 kW contracted power; 7500 kWh/year consumption (2500 kWh/year night); De- 
9 kW contracted power; 20000 kWh/year consumption (15000 kWh/year night). 
 
7 Industrial sector: Ia- 30kW contracted power; 30000 kWh/year consumption; Ib- 
50kW contracted power; 50000 kWh/year consumption; Ic- 100 kW contracted 
power; 160000 kWh/year consumption; Id- 500kW contracted power; 1250000 
kWh/year consumption; Ie- 500 kW contracted power; 2000000 kWh/year 
consumption; If- 2500 kW contracted power; 10000000 kWh/year consumption; 
Ig- 4000 kW contracted power; 24000000 kWh/year consumption; Ih- 10000 kW 
contracted power; 50000000 kWh/year consumption; Ii- 10000 kW contracted 
power; 70000000 kWh/year consumption. 
 
8 Data for industrial consumers Ih and Ii non available for the EU average. 
 
9 Own calculations, based on average prices before and after taxes. 
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